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Global Cities, Connectivity, and the Location Choice of MNC Regional Headquarters 
 
ABSTRACT 
One of the manifestations of the increasing diversity in multinational corporation (MNC) 
operations is the growing importance of regional headquarters (RHQs). RHQs assume an intermediary, 
bridging role between the corporate headquarters and local affiliates and other actors in their respective 
regions. They can have a coordination and control (i.e., administrative) mandate as well as an opportunity 
seeking (i.e., entrepreneurial) mandate. Since these mandates require RHQs to interact with various 
internal and external entities and exchange knowledge across distant locations, MNCs tend to locate their 
RHQs in highly connected “global cities” because these places allow the firm to economize on spatial 
transaction costs. In this paper, we explore the interplay between geographic distance, RHQ roles, and 
connectivity by analyzing which global city is selected by an MNC when establishing an RHQ. We argue 
that there is substantial heterogeneity among MNCs in the importance they attach to city connectivity—
which we conceptualize as encompassing the effects of the international flows of people, knowledge, and 
services—because the connectivity needs of an RHQ varies in relation to its corporate mandate as well as 
to the geographic configuration of the MNC’s activities. Our mixed logit analysis of the location choices 
for 1,031 newly established RHQs in 48 global cities between 2003 and 2012 provides qualified support 
for the notion that the relationship between city connectivity and location choice is more pronounced for 
RHQs with an entrepreneurial role. Although the geographic distance of a city to the MNC’s regional 
affiliates discourages the establishment of RHQs with administrative roles, distance effects disappear 
when the city is highly connected. Moreover, well connected cities are able to attract MNCs’ RHQs from 
distant countries-of-origin. 
 
Keywords: connectivity, geographic distance, global cities, location choice, regional headquarters 
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INTRODUCTION 
One of the manifestations of the increasing disaggregation and fragmentation of corporate 
headquarters operations (HQ) of multinational corporations (MNCs) (see, e.g., Desai 2009; McKinsey & 
Company, 2013) is the growing importance of regional headquarters (RHQs). RHQs have a mandate 
covering multiple countries in their regions (e.g., Europe, North America, or East Asia) and they play an 
important intermediary or bridging role between corporate headquarters and local affiliates and other 
regional actors (e.g. Hoenen, Nell, & Ambos, 2014;  Lehrer & Asakawa, 1999). RHQs perform intra-
regional coordination and control activities as well as entrepreneurial opportunity-seeking tasks by 
building ties with external actors such as existing and potential clients, suppliers, as well as local 
governments. At the same time, they maintain close contact with corporate headquarters to integrate and 
transfer knowledge and to align regional with corporate strategies. In doing so, RHQs are generally 
expected to manage the tradeoffs between global integration and local responsiveness (Hoenen et al., 
2014; Prahalad & Doz, 1987), to implement global strategies at a regional level and to act on regional 
opportunities (Yeung, Poon & Perry, 2001). 
The emergence of RHQs is a response, at least partially, to the regionalization trend in the world 
economy which is fragmented into major regions: the Americas, Europe, and East Asia (Rugman, 2000; 
Rugman & Verbeke, 2004). Regionalization has given impetus to the establishment of RHQs to develop 
and coordinate regional activities. In fact, the number of European RHQs has risen by 76 percent during 
2000-2010 (Ambos & Schlegelmilch, 2010) and, in 2005, more than 1,100 RHQs were established in the 
Asia-Pacific region (Enright, 2005). In fact, our own data on RHQs include more than 300 new RHQs 
established annually in recent years. 
A distinct aspect of HQ operations is that they are disproportionately concentrated in metropolitan 
areas (Bel & Fageda, 2008; Klier & Testa, 2002) - a trend which appears to be emerging also in 
developing economies (McKinsey & Company, 2013). The economic geography literature has suggested 
that major cities with unique connections to the outside world, so-called “global cities” such as London, 
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New York, and Singapore, function as centers of command and control that provide MNCs with global 
reach (Friedmann, 1986; Sassen, 1996)i. These cities have been noted for the availability of advanced 
producer services (such as marketing, accounting, law, and finance) their cosmopolitan environment and, 
of particular importance for our purposes, their extensive connectedness to local and global markets 
(Goerzen, Asmussen, & Nielsen, 2013). While the role of cities and city connectivity in the world 
economy has received substantial attention in the geography literature (Alderson & Beckfield, 2004; 
Beaverstock et al., 2002; Doel & Hubbard, 2002; Derudder et al., 2010; Sassen, 2001; Taylor, 2001), 
prior literature on MNCs’ RHQ location decisions has paid scant attention to global cities and the role of 
connectivity. For instance, Goerzen et al. (2013) examine the relationship between firm characteristics 
and MNCs’ decisions to locate affiliates in a global city but do not consider the role of connectivity. Ma, 
Delios & Lau (2013) limit analysis to Shanghai and Beijing as destination for foreign firms’ investments 
but also do not consider city connectivity. Bel & Fageda (2008) examine the role of airport infrastructure 
in location decisions for HQs but only for European metropolitan areas. Further, the recent thought pieces 
by Hoenen & Kostova (2015) as well as Baaij & Slangen (2013) consider various aspects of (geographic) 
distance and the relationships among HQ and subsidiaries but do not raise the concept of locational 
attributes in general or global cities specifically. 
While there is a good understanding of the general importance of global cities for HQ operations, 
our study is designed to understand which global city is chosen from a set of alternative locations in the 
region in which the MNCs choose to locate their RHQs. We examine the concept of global city 
connectivity and the role it plays in reducing spatial transaction costs that influence the location decisions 
for new RHQs. Drawing on the extant literature, we conceive of connectivity as multifaceted, including 
international flows of people, knowledge, and services (as discussed in greater detail in our conceptual 
background section below). Further, we define spatial transaction costs as those expenses that relate to the 
governance and monitoring of actions in the alignment of dispersed activities to achieve synergies or 
other competitive advantage (Baaij & Slangen, 2013). As such, spatial transaction costs can take several 
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forms such as the costs of communication, monitoring, and coordination not only of subsidiaries but also 
of external partners, as we discuss in detail in our hypotheses development section below. Our argument 
is that city connectivity can reduce several forms of spatial transaction costs which, in turn, reduces the 
role of geographic distance in location choice. 
We begin with the premise that RHQs, given their bridging function between corporate 
headquarters and regional affiliates, face significant spatial transaction costs and have strong connectivity 
needs, such that MNCs are likely to locate RHQs in global cities to take advantage of these cities’ 
connectivity, thereby economizing on the costs.ii While an understanding of the general importance of 
global cities for HQ operations is emerging, our study aims to understand which global city is chosen 
from a set of alternative locations in the region. We argue that the connectivity needs of RHQs are 
heterogeneous, depending on their mandate, the existing geographic configuration of affiliates, and the 
MNC’s HQ. At the same time, there is substantial heterogeneity among global cities as well, such that a 
given global city would be chosen if it economizes significantly on spatial transaction costs given the 
connectivity needs of the RHQ. Hence, both city heterogeneity and RHQ roles drive MNC location 
decisions for new RHQ establishments. In fact, we show that global cities’ connectivity can render 
inconsequential the geographic distance between a city, the corporate HQ, and its regional affiliates. 
Our study contributes to the literature on HQ locations and the spatial disaggregation of HQ 
functions, as well as the economic geography literature on global cities. We respond specifically to the 
recent call in Cano-Kollman, Cantwell, Hannigan, Mudambi, & Song (2016) for new insights into the 
interplay between geographic distance, RHQ roles, and connectivity. Empirically, we draw on an 
extensive database of new RHQ investments by MNCs and conduct a mixed logit analysis of the location 
choices for 1,031 greenfield RHQ investments in 48 global cities between 2003 and 2012. Our results 
inform the geography and global city literatures by demonstrating the role of connectivity in attracting 
RHQs with specific mandates and positions in the MNCs’ networks. To the literature on HQ locations we 
contribute what we believe to be the first study of the specific drivers of regional HQ locations in contrast 
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to prior research which has focused on corporate or divisional HQs (e.g., Bel & Fageda, 2008; Benito, 
Lunnan & Tomassen, 2011; Birkinshaw et al., 2006; Laamanen, Simula & Torstila, 2012; Voget, 2011). 
We demonstrate that the international connectivity of cities, rather than these cities’ local characteristics, 
determines much of their attraction for RHQ operations. 
We note that most prior studies of HQ locations were conducted at the country level, ignoring 
heterogeneous locational characteristics within countries. Other work, mostly within the regional 
economics domain, has adopted a subnational perspective but has restricted attention to HQ locations 
within a given region (e.g., the European Union) or country (e.g., Bel & Fageda, 2008; Diacon & Klier, 
2003; Henderson & Ono, 2008; Klier & Testa, 2002; Ma, Delios & Lau, 2013; Strauss-Kahn & Vives, 
2009). While these studies have enhanced our knowledge of HQ location choices, our study examines the 
locational determinants of RHQ locations worldwide in the context of global cities. Analyzing HQ 
location choice at the city level is most appropriate because MNCs ultimately choose a specific location 
within a country for investment (Goerzen et al., 2013) and may relocate HQ operations between cities 
within a country (Strauss-Kahn & Vives, 2009). Therefore, our study analyzes RHQ locations across a set 
of global cities, spread over five continents, that have been shown to be globally attractive and 
internationally connected (MasterCard, 2008). 
 
ANALYSIS OF BACKGROUND CONCEPTS 
The Importance of Spatial Transaction Costs to MNC Management and HQ Operations 
MNCs are driven to evaluate continuously the location of their operations and to relocate them 
whenever opportunities emerge to provide price-quality combinations that are satisfying to their 
demanding customers (Choi & Linton, 2011). These opportunities may include taking advantage of 
changing costs and qualities of labor, shifting knowledge bases, new (or dilapidating) infrastructure, 
emerging image or reputation, and changing qualities of life. In addition, MNCs need to maintain their 
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proximity to important stakeholders such as customers, shareholders, financiers, and competitors 
(Birkinshaw et al., 2006; Laamanen, Simula & Torstila, 2012; Strauss-Kahn & Vives, 2009). 
Since MNCs are compelled to situate their operational and administrative operations in locations 
that provide the greatest advantage, they become increasingly geographically dispersed creating acute 
management and operational challenges that must be overcome (Kunisch, Menz & Ambos, 2015). These 
management challenges take many forms including the coordination of strategic and tactical marketing 
decisions across locations, make or buy choices, as well as a myriad of small, critical decisions relating to 
accounting, finance, and taxation, human resources and staffing - not to mention emerging global issues 
such as environmental sustainability and social justice. These exchanges of knowledge and information 
between head office and subsidiaries are essential also because they allow for learning, thereby increasing 
the MNC’s knowledge base which could be a source of competitive advantage (Bouquet et al., 2009; 
Gupta & Govindarajan, 2000). 
Organizing and monitoring corporate and local decisions can be achieved through a variety of 
channels including face-to-face interaction, telephone, video conferencing, emails, faxes, and letters 
(Bouquet et al., 2009; Nobel & Birkinshaw, 1998). A critical underlying element in this process is 
whether the knowledge and information to be transferred is explicit, in the case of rules or instructions, or 
tacit, in the case of experience or more nuanced insights. Less explicit, tacit knowledge requires great 
attention because the transmission is not straightforward. Thus, personal monitoring is often necessary 
requiring on-site demonstrations or face-to-face communication (Bresman, Birkinshaw & Nobel, 1999). 
Further, while the transfer of explicit, codifiable information may be a simple coordinating activity, it is 
still not without significant cost and effort—management time in particular. Previous authors have made 
the point that various types of distance (e.g., geographic, social, cognitive, institutional, economic, and 
cultural) increase the costs of exchanging knowledge with subsidiaries and of coordination and 
monitoring (Ambos & Håkanson, 2014; Asmussen & Goerzen, 2013; Dellestrand & Kappen, 2012; 
Slangen, 2011) through travel time (Boeh & Beamish, 2012) and managerial opportunity cost (McCann, 
8 
 
2011). A key issue in the analysis of regional coordination and control of an MNC’s dispersed operations, 
therefore, is that of the spatial transaction costs of information and knowledge (Baaij et al., 2015; Barner-
Rasmussen et al., 2007; Beugelsdijk, McCann, & Mudambi, 2010; Cano-Kollmann et al., 2016) that vary 
with the RHQ’s role within the MNC as discussed below. 
Regional Headquarters Roles within an MNC 
An MNC is defined as a group of geographically dispersed and goal disparate operations that 
include its HQ and the different national subsidiaries that can be seen as a network of subsidiaries with a 
hierarchically acting headquarters (Ghoshal & Bartlett, 1990; Rugman & Verbeke, 2001). MNCs’ 
affiliates are embedded in internal networks as well as their external environments (Ciabuschi, 
Dellestrand & Martin, 2011; Foss, Foss & Nell, 2012; Nell, Ambos & Schlegelmilch, 2011). As a critical 
node in these networks, an RHQ is embedded in its parent firm’s internal network and its regional 
environment (Hoenen et al., 2014).  
The general role of the RHQ is to bridge the distance between HQ, regional affiliates, and markets 
and the establishment of RHQs has risen as a solution to the trade-off between global integration and 
local responsiveness (Prahalad & Doz, 1987). The rationale of the establishment of an RHQ is to create 
value within the MNC by sharing knowledge, synergizing management, and providing supporting 
services (Goold & Campbell, 1998; Lunnan & Zhao, 2014). Within the internal MNC network, the RHQ 
builds links with local subsidiaries across the host region to monitor, coordinate, and control these 
subsidiaries’ business activities. At the same time, it maintains a strong relationship with the HQ and -if 
present- sister RHQs or divisional HQs, to exchange information and to achieve intrafirm synergy. 
Externally, the RHQ collects and reports information concerning regional market opportunities and 
business environment changes (e.g., new government regulations). In their role as brokers, RHQs have to 
understand local affiliate contexts as well as the corporate priorities of their HQs. The importance of 
RHQs for MNCs has been documented in various regions, Asia-Pacific and Europe in particular (e.g., 
Alfoldi, Clegg & McGaughey, 2012; Ambos & Schlegelmilch, 2010; Yeung et al., 2001). 
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The literature on RHQs has identified two major mandates with which these intermediate 
management units can be charged: an entrepreneurial role and an administrative role (e.g., Chandler, 
1991; Lasserre, 1996; Mahnke et al., 2012). An entrepreneurial role entails scouting for talent, seeking 
out new business opportunities, and signaling commitment to local markets. RHQs assist regional 
affiliates in identifying opportunities, to act on them, and to share information with corporate HQ. 
Opportunities identified in one particular affiliate context may have value beyond that context and the 
RHQ is instrumental in drawing attention to this within the region and at corporate HQ. RHQs with a 
specific entrepreneurial mandate may also be established as a first investment in a region to function as a 
regional beachhead for business development and to prepare for the establishment of other affiliates 
(Lasserre, 1996). An administrative role, on the other hand, implies serving as the command, control, and 
coordination center of dispersed activities in the region, orchestrating resource pooling, and leading the 
effort to achieve intrafirm synergy. 
Given the specific bridging function of the RHQ and its presence as a central node in MNCs’ 
affiliate networks, RHQs have strong and diverse needs to connect to a variety of internal and external 
partners in different locations. They have a responsibility to encourage the flow of assets, knowledge, 
information, and resources in the internal and external networks of the MNC, which are indispensable in 
creating value and enhancing competitive advantage. This implies that the MNC’s decision as to where to 
locate the RHQ with its bridging function takes on greater strategic importance and is likely to be 
governed by the international connectivity that the location can facilitate, as discussed below. 
Cities and International Connectivity 
The concept of international connectivity of cities or regions has received most attention in the 
economic geography literature (e.g., Bathelt, Malmberg & Maskell, 2004) and more recently has been 
studied from a more integrated perspective focusing on the role of individuals and firm actors that create 
this connectivity (Lorenzen & Mudambi, 2013; Saxenian & Hsu, 2001). We define connectivity as the 
ease and intensity with which people, goods, capital, and knowledge flow across space. Connectivity 
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created by organizations is referred to as ‘organizational pipelines’ - since flows are focused and directed 
- while connectivity via individuals is decentralized and more dispersed (Lorenzen & Mudambi, 2013). 
MNCs are responsible for most of the ‘organizational pipeline’ linkages, while ethnic diasporas are 
perhaps the most salient example of connectivity created by groups of individuals (Saxenian, 2006; 
Saxenian & Hsu, 2001).  
Three approaches have been developed within the economic geography and cities literatures to 
understand this connectivity: the infrastructure approach, the corporate organization approach, and the 
knowledge-centered approach. The infrastructure approach focuses on the set of enabling systems and 
technologies that underpin border-crossing urban networks (see, e.g., Derudder et al., 2010; Derudder & 
Witlox, 2008; Malecki, 2002; Smith & Timberlake, 2001). From this perspective, global city connectivity 
is facilitated by air transport, telecommunication circuits, and non-voice data transfer systems (Knox & 
Taylor, 1995). These enabling communication and transport networks undergird the flows of capital, 
people, and information which are fundamental to the connectivity of key cities (Córdoba Ordóñez & 
Gago García, 2010; Mahutga, Ma, Smith & Timberlake, 2010; Pirie, 2010). Among these networks, 
airline linkages offer the clearest illustration of global city connectivity (Knox & Taylor, 1995). The 
literature on HQ (re-)location has confirmed the importance to firms of a well-developed airline traffic 
infrastructure (Bel & Fageda, 2008; Testa, Klier & Ono, 2005). 
In contrast, the corporate organization approach starts from the observation that relations between 
cities are primarily created by firms pursuing transnational location strategies (see, e.g., Alderson & 
Beckfield, 2004; Derudder et al., 2003; Wall & van der Knaap, 2011). This model builds upon the 
concept that global cities are part of a process of servicing of global capital by advanced producer service 
firms (e.g., accounting, advertising, finance, insurance, and law). This differs from maps of infrastructural 
flows (i.e., airlines, etc.) because the basic agents of world city connection from this perspective are 
global service firms with their worldwide office networks. These service firms weave cities into a global 
network in the course of their work, such that intra-firm flows of information, knowledge, and direction 
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can be estimated from the size and functions of pairs of city offices. In this way, connectivity between 
cities can be estimated by the presence of leading global service firms across these cities generating in a 
world city network (Taylor, 2001), an approach that has been widely applied to analyze inter-urban 
connectivity in different contexts (Bassens et al., 2010; Hoyler, Freytag & Mager, 2008; Huang, Lu, & 
Sellers, 2007; Taylor & Aranya, 2008). 
Research that has adopted the corporate organization approach has singled out connectedness as a 
key trait of global cities through the networks of corporate service firms. These firms generate and 
facilitate flows of information across geographically dispersed organizations (Wagner, Hoisl & Thoma, 
2014) and provide seamless services for their corporate clients (Beaverstock, et al., 2002; Doel & 
Hubbard, 2002). Corporate clients are often MNCs and, more specifically, the HQ command and control 
operations of MNCs. Thus, a city’s position in these global city networks via organizational pipelines 
provided by internationally producer services firms is likely to be an important attractor to HQ operations 
as they can assist them in the provision of HQ services across borders (Lunnan & Zhao, 2014; Monteiro, 
Arvidsson & Birkinshaw, 2008).  
The third strand of research (i.e., the knowledge-centered approach) has emphasized that 
interregional and intercity relations can also be defined by flows of knowledge and information. This 
literature has argued that, to succeed in a world in which competition is increasingly based on knowledge, 
a city or region cannot only rely on its own local knowledge base but also needs to encourage external 
knowledge inflows (Asheim & Coenen, 2006; Bathelt et al., 2004). Dynamic regions and cities are 
characterized both by dense local knowledge circulation as well as by strong international connections to 
outside knowledge networks (Laud, Grein & Nachum, 2009). This approach shares the notion of the 
corporate organization approach that world cities are hubs of knowledge production, creating a global 
space of knowledge flows, while the competitiveness of a city is determined more by its international 
connectedness than by its locally bounded characteristics (Doel & Hubbard, 2002). 
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Research in this tradition has shown that regions’ technological performance is positively 
associated with such cross-regional and international linkages (Maggioni, Nosvelli & Uberti, 2007; 
Miguélez & Moreno, 2013). Geographically distant inventor network ties are important conduits for 
knowledge flows as they increase the diversity of ideas within the local knowledge base and enrich local 
innovation dynamics (Bell & Zaheer, 2007; Boschma & Frenken, 2010; Malmberg & Maskell, 2002).iii 
Thus, city connectivity could also be gauged through indicators of international knowledge flows and 
knowledge co-creation such as co-invention, co-authorship, and citation patterns (Matthiessen, Schwarz, 
& Find, 2010). 
Taken together, we conclude that various meaningful concepts of connectivity have been analyzed 
in the extant literature, yet each focuses on a specific aspect of interlinkages between distant locations due 
to individuals and organizations. For MNCs and their (R)HQ operations, these individual concepts cover 
partially overlapping dimensions of connectivity such as the ease of travel across locations as related to 
airport infrastructure, the presence of producer services firms generating knowledge flows between cities 
and providing seamless functional services to MNCs, and the international flows of ideas and knowledge 
due to individual and intra-MNC international (co-inventor) linkages. Hence, the connectivity concept 
should be broadly defined to capture relevant traits of cities. We adopt, therefore, an integrative and 
broader approach, conceptualizing connectivity as encompassing the effects of flows of people (airport 
passengers), services (producer services firms), and knowledge (co-invention). In our hypothesis 
development below, we make use of this more inclusive concept of international connectivity. 
 
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
International Connectivity and RHQ Location 
Given their role as intermediaries between external actors, affiliates within the region, and with 
corporate HQs, RHQs have unique international connectivity needs. RHQs play an important role in 
identifying and absorbing knowledge within the region and facilitating knowledge transfer to affiliates 
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and corporate HQs (Lunnan & Zhao, 2014). As it is expensive to search, process, and exchange 
information, the spatial transaction costs associated with this task can be substantial. RHQs established in 
a global city with strong international knowledge connections would be in a better position to access 
knowledge variety of distant origins within the city, facilitating this task. 
Knowledge exchange, cross-unit collaboration, and effective coordination across units also requires 
that managers, employees, and external partners meet, build ties, and exchange tacit knowledge 
(Castellani, Jimenez & Zanfei, 2013). This requires manager and employee mobility across dispersed 
locations, such as corporate HQ, affiliates, and locations in the region where partners and business 
opportunities are present. The direct and indirect costs of travel including expenditures as well as 
management time are, therefore, an important consideration in the establishment of RHQs (Boeh & 
Beamish, 2012; Bel & Fageda, 2008; Testa, Klier & Ono, 2005). Thus, aside from reducing the costs of 
mobility, global cities would reduce the needs for RHQ management to travel to seek out information as 
these places are hubs of learning and knowledge.iv 
To fulfil their administrative and entrepreneurial roles, RHQs regularly need to source business 
services such as accounting, advertising, finance, consulting, and human resource management (Ono, 
2003; Sassen, 1996). Producer services firms with global operations and offices can connect the RHQ to 
these firms’ wider networks. Thus, in their internal coordinating role as well as their external information 
gathering role, RHQs can benefit from the presence of internationally connected advanced producer 
services firms who position themselves in global cities to provide these specialized services to MNCs. 
This reasoning suggests that a global city with a high degree of international producer service 
connectivity is likely to be a preferred location for an RHQ as it benefits from the seamless services 
provided. It follows that the attractiveness of a city for RHQ establishment increases with these key 
dimensions of a city’s international connectivity, leading to our first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: The propensity of an MNC to choose a particular global city as the location for its RHQ is 
positively associated with the city’s international connectivity. 
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The Impact of Heterogeneous RHQ Roles  
 The role of RHQs has received increasing attention by scholars as MNCs attempt to match their 
organizational structures to the demands placed upon them (Hoenen et al., 2014; Lunnan & Zhao, 2014; 
Mahnke et al., 2012; Yeung et al., 2001). In the literature, two types of RHQ roles have been identified, 
one of which is an entrepreneurial role that involves scouting for talent, acquiring market knowledge, 
seeking out business opportunities, and signaling an emerging commitment to local markets, with the 
other being an administrative role in managing regional affiliates (Ambos & Schlegelmilch, 2010; 
Chandler, 1991; Hoenen et al., 2014; Lasserre, 1996; Mahnke et al., 2012). We expect that heterogeneity 
in the roles performed by RHQs would also have consequences for the valuation of, and fit with, global 
city characteristics. These different RHQ roles would require different city environments and, therefore, 
the locational choices for RHQs would align with these roles. 
 We propose that an RHQ with an entrepreneurial role is likely to value international connectivity 
more highly than an RHQ with an administrative and coordinating role. RHQs performing primarily 
entrepreneurial roles typically would be established in the early stages of an MNC’s entry in a region, as 
it penetrates a new regional market. In these early stages, in-house managerial resources and expertise 
would be stretched to capacity (Slangen, 2016). The process of seeking new business opportunities and 
exploring the regional environment, therefore, would depend on the flow of information and ideas 
through the global city’s international knowledge connections as well as the advanced producer service 
firms (e.g., marketing, advertising, human resources services) that, by design, are internationally 
coordinated and can provide information, contacts, ideas, and leads that are useful in the entrepreneurial 
stage. Given that travel intensity will be high when the MNC aims to establish itself in a new region, 
connectivity provided by air infrastructure also is likely to be important.  
 Since MNCs that establish an entrepreneurial RHQ tend to lack previous experience in that particular 
host region, an internationally connected city can address the salient informational and connectivity needs 
of the RHQ. In contrast, MNCs that establish an RHQ with a coordinating or administrative role already 
15 
 
have been operating existing affiliates in that region. Through these operations, the RHQ can draw upon 
an existing knowledge base on regional conditions and opportunities. In this situation, addressing cross-
border informational needs and acquiring access to external sources of knowledge would be less likely to 
be salient. This suggests our following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: The positive relationship between the propensity of a firm choosing a global city for its 
RHQ and the city’s international connectivity is stronger for RHQs with an entrepreneurial role than an 
administrative role. 
The Role of Geographic Distance in the RHQ Location Decision 
Geographic distance generally increases coordination costs by adding to the spatial transaction 
costs of transport and travel expenses thereby making the exchange of tacit knowledge more costly (Berry, 
Guillen & Zhou, 2010; Boeh & Beamish, 2012; Castellani, Jimenez & Zanfei, 2013). Prior research has 
found that national manufacturing HQs tend to be located in close proximity to production plants 
(Henderson & Ono, 2008) and has shown the benefits of collocation (e.g. Alcacer & Delgado, 2013; 
Defever, 2012). 
Based on this reasoning, the RHQ has to cope with at least two types of geographic distance to 
other units of the MNC: distance to the corporate HQ and, if the RHQ performs an administrative role, 
distance to regional affiliates. While the rationale of setting up an RHQ is to bridge distance to local 
affiliates because the corporate HQ is located too far away to perform coordination functions effectively, 
geographic distance to corporate HQ is a key spatial transaction cost factor that would favor cities in the 
region that are more proximate to the HQ. At the same time, the geographic characteristics of a MNC’s 
existing network of subsidiaries is likely to be a major consideration in location decisions for RHQs with 
an administrative role since closer interaction with and coordination of these affiliates is a core objective 
of these RHQs. Further, if a city is located close to the existing affiliates of the firm in the region, 
management time would be minimized, travel costs would be reduced, tacit knowledge exchange would 
be faster and more effective, thereby reducing the spatial transaction costs of communication and 
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coordination. This implies that MNCs would have a preference for those global cities that are positioned 
geographically closer to the HQ and geographically more central to the existing affiliate locations, leading 
to our next hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3a: The propensity of a firm to choose a particular global city as the location for its RHQ is 
negatively associated with the geographic distance between the city and the firm’s corporate 
headquarters. 
Hypothesis 3b: The propensity of a firm to choose a particular global city as the location for its RHQ is 
negative associated with the average geographic distance between the city and the firm’ existing affiliates 
in the region. 
Global Cities’ International Connectivity in Mitigating the Effect of Geographic Distance  
Since MNCs are compelled to locate their operations wherever the greatest advantages are 
available, they are becoming increasingly dispersed geographically. Yet, we know from prior research 
that spatial transactions costs arise whenever organizations need to bridge distances. This dispersion 
creates significant management challenges that must be overcome organizationally, through the 
establishment and ongoing activities of both HQ and RHQ (Kunisch, Menz, & Ambos, 2015). 
Organizing and monitoring management choices requires RHQs to engage in various personal or 
direct interactions such as on-site demonstrations or face-to-face communication (Bouquet et al., 2009; 
Bresman, Birkinshaw, & Nobel, 1999) especially when the knowledge and information to be shared or 
transferred is less explicit. When geographic distances rise, the cost of these information sharing activities 
also rise (Asmussen & Goerzen, 2013; Dellestrand & Kappen, 2012; Slangen, 2011). While an obvious 
spatial transaction cost is that of travel (Boeh & Beamish, 2012) a less obvious but perhaps somewhat 
more important is that of managerial opportunity cost (McCann, 2011). 
While the essential role of an RHQ is to initiate, facilitate, and organize effectively the flow of 
information across distances, these organizations must also economize on these activities and at the same 
time aim to overcome their inherently higher costs due to the liability of foreignness (Asmussen & 
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Goerzen, 2013). A key issue in the analysis of the regional coordination and control of an MNC’s 
dispersed operations, therefore, is that of the spatial transaction costs of information and knowledge 
transfer (Baaij et al., 2015; Beugelsdijk, McCann & Mudambi, 2010; Cano-Kollmann et al., 2016). 
We argue that the choice to locate an RHQ in a global city is an important way in which MNCs 
mitigate the spatial transaction costs of geographic distance. Global cities are able to provide advanced 
producer services (such as marketing, accounting, law, and finance) and are extensively connected to 
local and global markets through infrastructures that facilitate the movement of people, information and 
knowledge (Goerzen, Asmussen & Nielsen, 2013). This connectivity reduces the effects of distance by 
reducing management travel time through efficient and effective transportation modes (e.g., airports). It 
also makes it possible for managers to avoid the direct and opportunity costs of travel in the first place, as 
cross-border services can be obtained from advanced producer services firms and since international and 
regional knowledge flow into the global city and, thereby, towards the RHQ. Taken together, a global 
city’s international connectivity bridges geographic distance for the RHQ, making coordination, 
integration, communication, and knowledge exchange over geographic distance more effective and less 
costly. It follows that geographic distance would have a lesser bearing on location decisions for RHQs by 
MNCs if the city is characterized by stronger international connectivity, as per our hypothesis below. 
Hypothesis 4a: The negative relationship between the propensity of a firm choosing a global city for its 
RHQ and the geographic distance with corporate headquarters is mitigated by the city’s international 
connectivity. 
Hypothesis 4b: The negative relationship between the propensity of a firm choosing a global city for its 
RHQ and the average distance between a city and the firm’s existing affiliates is mitigated by the city’s 
international connectivity.  
 
DATA, VARIABLES, AND METHODS 
Our analysis draws on an extensive database on cross-border greenfield investments compiled by 
the Financial Times Ltd (FDI Markets). The dataset records more than 120,000 cross-border investment 
projects between 2003-2012, covering activities such as HQs, R&D, manufacturing, and sales & service. 
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The coverage of the FDI Markets database is seen as representative for FDI flows (Castellani et al, 2013; 
Crescenzi, Pietrobelli & Rabellotti, 2014; D’Agostino, Laursen & Santangelo, 2013). Our dataset 
identifies the investing firm, type of project, host country, host city, and sector in which the investing firm 
operates. The dataset of investments in HQ activity also contains a short text describing the characteristics 
of the investment project. From these texts, we coded the type and regional mandate of HQ investment 
projects. For our study, we are interested in regional headquarters covering multiple potential global cities 
as potential host locations of the RHQ investment. Global corporate headquarters and purely national 
headquarters projects (e.g., a French HQ) were not selected.v In total, we identified 2,510 such RHQ 
investments. Below, we provide an illustration of an RHQ project with a broad regional mandate: 
“Lexicon Relocation, a subsidiary of US-based The Suddath Companies, has announced that it has 
opened its new pan Asia headquarters in Hong Kong. The company, a leading provider of employee 
relocation and global assignment management services, has placed its new office in the Hopewell Centre 
tower on Queen’s Road East. Lexicon Relocation selected Hong Kong for its pivotal position as one of 
the world's leading financial and business centres, an established gateway to the Asia-Pacific region and 
preferred location for multinational companies as well as their regional headquarters.” 
In line with our research question, our analysis focuses on RHQ investments in ‘global cities’. We 
include cities that are ranked as having the most important ‘Global Power’ by MasterCard (2008) which 
ranks 75 global cities based on seven dimensions of city characteristics such as legal and political 
framework, economic stability, and ease of doing business, information flows, and livability. A number of 
data limitations -which we describe below- required us to limit the analysis to 48 of these global cities. 
A second source of firm-level data concerns information on worldwide affiliate ownership 
available in Bureau van Dijk’s ORBIS database. Using ORBIS we identified the controlling MNC behind 
the RHQ investment project as well as the MNC’s regional affiliates. Existing affiliates of the focal 
MNCs were identified by applying a minimum of fifty percent ownership of first tier affiliates to ensure 
management responsibility and control. Affiliate networks in earlier years were determined using 
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information on the dates of incorporation and, if applicable, dates of acquisition or divestment based on 
information from the Zephyr M&A database. With the limitation of RHQ projects to those located in 48 
cities and since not all firms with RHQ investment projects could be matched to ORBIS, our sample of 
RHQ projects was reduced to 1,031 investments made by 940 firms. 
A specific feature of the current analysis of RHQs is that the choice set - the set of global cities 
from among which the firm chooses one as a location for the RHQ project - differs across projects, 
depending on the specific regional mandate of the RHQ. This is because, by definition, regional 
headquarters are located within the region that constitutes their geographic mandate. We determined the 
precise regional mandate from the available text descriptions and constructed the relevant choice set of 
global cities accordingly. For instance, the regional mandate of the RHQ project described above implies 
that global cities in Asia are potential locations but cities in Europe or the Americas are not. Table 1 
shows the distribution of RHQs over global cities grouped broadly by regional mandate. Singapore, Hong 
Kong, and Shanghai are the three cities that received most investments in the Asia Pacific region; London, 
Amsterdam, and Dublin are the top three cities in Europe, while San Francisco, Atlanta, Chicago, and 
New York are the top cities in North America. 
**************INSERT TABLE 1*************** 
Variables 
The dependent variable in our analysis is a binary variable taking the value of one if the city in 
the choice set is selected for the RHQ investment, and zero for all other cities in the choice set. The 
choice set for an RHQ investment consists of those global cities that are located within the area of the 
regional mandate of the RHQ. 
Hypothesis testing variables: Connectivity. Our measure of connectivity is a composite of three 
items: cities’ producer services connectivity, airport passenger traffic, and international co-inventor 
activity. Data on international producer service connectivity of cities are obtained from Loughborough 
University’s GaWC resources for the year 2000, and from Derudder et al. (2010) for the years 2004, 
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2008, and 2010. Taylor (2001) ranked 315 cities based on their inter-connectivity created by multinational 
producer services firms. Connectivity is calculated as the weighted number of linkages between a city and 
314 other world cities created by the world’s top 100 producer service firms through their global networks 
of offices. These firms supply advanced producer services (accountancy, advertising, finance, insurance, 
law, and management consultancy) through offices in at least fifteen cities, including at least one in each 
of the Asia Pacific, Western European, and North American regions. The connectivity index is based on 
the premise that flows of information between cities in the network are a function of the importance of the 
office. Service values of offices function as connectivity weights and are measured on a scale of 1-5 
depending on the size and scope of the offices. The connectivity of a city is the product of a producer 
services firm’s service value in a city and the firm’s service values in all other cities, summed over all 
producer services firms (Derudder et al., 2010).vi The scope of the analysis of city networks has been 
expanded in the more recent years to 526 cities and to cover 175 large producer services firms. London, 
New York, Hong Kong, Paris, Tokyo, and Singapore are the best connected cities. Connectivity is taken 
as a relative index score of the city compared to London (with the score of London taking the value 
100).vii 
Airport connectivity has been found to attract HQ operations (e.g., Bel & Fageda, 2008). As an 
indicator of the international flow of people to and from a city, we include the yearly number of 
passengers recorded at the global cities’ airports, drawn from airports’ and city websites. We would have 
liked to use international passenger traffic and information on flight destinations but this information was 
not available for a large set of cities on different continents. Even using international air passengers would 
not constitute a superior measure of connectivity of a city, as airports differ in the importance of transit 
passengers. The airports of London, New York, Paris, Hong Kong, and Singapore have most passenger 
traffic in 2011. We normalize airport passenger flows by expressing passenger numbers as an index 
relative to London (100). 
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Co-inventor connectivity measures are derived from patent application data. Patent data are 
drawn from the OECD REGPAT database, which provides fine-grained regional indicators for patents, 
utilizing the addresses of the applicants and inventors to allocate patents to regions. The database 
currently covers more than 5,500 regions mainly across OECD countries. Since regionalized patent data 
are not available for a range of non-OECD countries, this reduces the number of cities we can include in 
the analysis to 48. We retrieve patents filed under the Patent Co-operation Treaty (PCT). Since the PCT 
provides a unified procedure for filing patent applications to protect inventions in each of the contracting 
states of the PCT, these patents are generally applied for inventions for which firms seek protection in 
various regions (e.g., US, EU, and Japan) and are the least likely to exhibit a regional or city bias. We 
matched inventors to global cities based on available concordances linking NUTS-3/TL3 regions with 
metropolitan areas on the basis of the regionalized addresses of the inventors.viii When a patent with an 
inventor in a global city involves at least one co-inventor residing outside the global city’s country, we 
count this as an international knowledge linkage. Our measure of international knowledge connectivity is 
then constructed as the share of city patents with international knowledge linkage(s) in the total number of 
patents invented in the city and we normalize the measure to a scale of 0-100, with Geneva in the year 
2006 as the benchmark. Cities with the most internationally connected inventive activities tend to be cities 
in smaller and open economies: Geneva, Brussels, Zurich, Lisbon, and Singapore.  
We calculate our composite measure of connectivity by averaging the indexed scores across the 
three dimensions of connectivity. Hence, we adopt the ‘maximum-weight’ approach to aggregation (see, 
e.g., OECD, 2008) using for each city the formula ܥ ൌ 100∑ ሺ ௑೔௑೘ೌೣሻ/3
ଷ௫ୀଵ , with Xi the value for the 
different connectivity dimensions.ix The top ranked cities in 2011 are New York, Shanghai, Hong Kong, 
Singapore, and Paris. 
RHQ Mandates. We utilize information on the mandate of the RHQ and data on regional 
affiliates drawn from ORBIS to establish the presence of an entrepreneurial or administrative role for the 
RHQ. Although the description of the projects sometimes allows us to determine the specific role, 
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relevant information is provided only for a minority of projects and information on potential joint roles is 
often lacking. Therefore, we rely primarily on information on regional affiliates from the ORBIS database. 
We start from the notion that firms without operating affiliates in the region at the time of the RHQ 
establishment would not have an administrative role and, therefore, the RHQ would focus on 
entrepreneurial activities. In case there are affiliates in the region, the RHQ would perform an 
administrative role –although we recognize this may often be combined with an entrepreneurial role. We 
checked the consistency between this categorization based on affiliates in the region and the texts on 
RHQ projects and found a high accuracy. Below, we provide two examples of RHQ descriptions: one 
RHQ with an entrepreneurial role and one with an administrative role, respectively: 
“June 2012 - Big Nerd Ranch (United States) is investing in the city of Amsterdam (West-
Nederland), Netherlands in the Business Services sector in a Headquarters project, creating 5 jobs. US-
based Big Nerd Ranch, which offers immersive IT courses and learning centres, has opened its first 
international facility in Amsterdam, the Netherlands, creating five jobs. The European headquarters will 
offer a full schedule of classes and bootcamps in areas of IT, and employment is expected to double at the 
site by 2013.” 
“Office equipment manufacturer Konica Minolta Business Technologies, a subsidiary of Japan-
based Konica Minolta, has established a new headquarters office in Singapore. The new presence will 
employ 189 people and will engage in the supervision and management of the company’s sales, logistics 
and marketing activities in the south-east Asia region. Konica Minolta Business Solutions Asia has been 
established to manage the office, one of a number the company is opening in south-east Asia and the 
Middle East.” 
Big Nerd Ranch had no prior affiliates in Europe, while Konica Minolta has an extensive affiliate 
network in Asia. We test Hypothesis 2 by creating two separate variables for connectivity effects: 
connectivity for RHQs with only an entrepreneurial mandate and connectivity for RHQs with an 
administrative role (which could be combined with an entrepreneurial role). We perform t-tests on the 
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equality of coefficients, while also taking into account that the impact of connectivity changes depending 
on distance. 
Distance. The variable distance to HQ (H3a) is the great circle geographic distance between HQ 
and the focal host city. It was determined by geocoding the HQ city address and each global city in the 
choice set; for global cities, we used the coordinates of the city center. The average geographic distance 
between a focal global city and the affiliates of the investing firm in the region (H3b) was determined by 
geocoding each affiliate based on the address information, thereby establishing latitude and longitude. 
Distance is the great circle distance between the affiliate and the global city and the average distance is 
the average of distances between the city and the firms’ affiliates. We test Hypotheses 4a and 4b by 
including interaction terms between international connectivity and average distance and between 
connectivity and distance to HQ. 
We take the variables connectivity, distance to HQ, and distance to affiliates in deviation from the 
sample mean before interacting such that the coefficient of the main effects of connectivity and the two 
distances variables represent their effects evaluated at mean distance and mean connectivity, respectively. 
Control variables. We include a wide range of control variables in our analysis. We control for city 
population, population density (population divided by surface area of the city), city-level GDP per capita. 
Data on city population and GDP are drawn from the OECD’s metropolitan data and Citymayors data and 
data on surface areas of cities are retrieved from city websites. In addition, we include as an indicator of 
the economic importance of the city’s country in the region (country/region GDP ratio) the ratio of the 
country’s GDP to the host region GDP. Firms may prefer cities located in a major market in the region. 
Country level GDP data are taken from the World Development Indicators. We also include a dummy 
variable indicating whether the city is a capital city. Capital cities may be more attractive to headquarters 
due the concentration of political power and their regulatory roles (e.g. Ma et al., 2013). As a proxy for 
the availability of human capital in the city the models include the number of world top 400 universities 
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in the city. Data on world top 400 universities come are drawn from the Times Higher Education yearly 
rankings.  
We control for a number of other ‘distance’ effects between the home country of the MNC and the 
country of the global city. First, we control for language distance, drawing on language distance data 
from Dow & Karunaratna (2006). The language distance measure takes into account the ‘closeness’ of 
languages, the incidence of languages spoken in a both country, and the heterogeneity of spoken 
languages in the countries. Language issues may be less salient if the English language proficiency in the 
host country is strong since this would reduce communication costs and facilitates multinational firms’ 
business activities. We follow Slangen (2011) and Cuypers, Ertug & Hennart (2015) by taking the 
average Test of English as a Foreign Language (TOEFL) scores published by Educational Testing 
Services (ETS) divided by the maximum score that an examinee can obtain as the measure of English 
language proficiency. x  In addition, our analyses include a composite measure of other non-spatial 
dimensions of distance between the country of origin and the country of the global city (other distance). 
The composite measure aggregates over cultural distance, economic distance, and institutional distance 
using the maximum-weight approach. The measure of cultural distance draws on the 6-component 
indicators due to Hofstede, Hofstede & Minkov (2010) using the aggregation method proposed by Kogut 
& Singh (1988). The measures of institutional distance and economic distance are taken from Berry at al. 
(2011)xi. 
The models include three cost-related factors, i.e., the corporate tax rate, the local wage level, and 
costs related to labor market rigidities. Taxes are an important component of operational cost for most 
international firms and the location of headquarters of a firm is often the place where profits are taxed 
(Desai, 2009). Corporate tax levels are likely to have a negative effect on the attractiveness of cities for 
HQ activities, as suggested by earlier studies (e.g., Laamanen et al., 2012; Strauss-Kahn & Vives, 2009; 
Voget, 2011). Data on corporate tax rates at the country level are obtained from KPMG. High wage costs 
have also been found to discourage HQ investments (Davis & Henderson, 2008; Strauss-Kahn & Vives, 
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2009). Data on wage levels of skilled employees at the city level are obtained from the UBS’ Price and 
Earnings reports. We use information on employment rigidity from the World Bank’s Doing Business 
reports to include a variable measuring labor market rigidities. The rigidity index is the average of 3 sub 
indices: a difficulty of hiring, rigidity of hours, and difficulty of firing. The labor market rigidity index 
takes values on a 0-100 scale. Finally, we control for the presence of firms’ existing affiliates in the city at 
the time of the RHQ investment to controls for colocation benefits and prior city experience (Alcacer & 
Delgado, 2013; Defever, 2012). 
All continuous variables are taken in logarithmic form and all variables are one year lagged with 
respect to the year of the RHQ investment. Summary statistics of the explanatory variables are provided 
in Table 2 and coefficients of correlation are given in Table 3. On average, the composite connectivity 
index of global cities is about 39, which compares to a level of 82 for London (2011) as the most 
connected city.xii The average distance between the city and the focal firm’s affiliates in the region is 660 
kilometers. Among the RHQs, 65 percent have an entrepreneurial role without any existing affiliate in the 
region prior to the RHQ investment. On average, the 48 global cities are home to almost two world top 
400 universities. About 59 percent of the global cities are capital cities. The correlation coefficients show 
no multicollinearity concerns. 
**************INSERT TABLES 2 AND 3*************** 
Methods 
Analysis of the decision by MNCs in which global city - from among a set of regional alternatives -
to locate an RHQ requires a discrete choice model. The most commonly used model in the location choice 
literature (e.g., Alcacer & Chung, 2007; Belderbos & van Olffen, 2011; Head, Ries & Swenson, 1995) is 
the conditional logit model (McFadden, 1974) which can be derived from firms’ profit maximization. The 
conditional logit model, however, provides consistent estimates only under relatively strict assumptions: 
the requirement that relative choice probabilities stay equal with or without the inclusion of other 
alternatives (the ‘independence of irrelevant alternatives’) and the related requirement of the absence of 
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correlations between error terms across alternatives. In practice, these assumptions are often violated; a 
solution, however, is to estimate a generalized form of the conditional logit model: the mixed logit model 
(e.g., Basile, Castellani & Zanfei, 2008; Chung & Alcacer, 2002) which relaxes these assumptions 
(McFadden & Train, 2000). The mixed logit model estimates a set of fixed coefficients as well as a 
random parts of these coefficients that account for unobservable effects and become significant if there is 
substantial heterogeneity among firms or choices. Formally, we estimate the following equation:  
                                                        (1)  
Where Pfr is the probability that firm f invests in city r rather than in cities j.  Xfr, t-1 represents a vector of 
city characteristics for which coefficients α are estimated, Zfr,t-1 is the corresponding vector of city 
characteristics with λf a vector of random parameters with zero mean following a density function g(λf). 
Since the locational choice probability has to be calculated over all possible values of λf, the mixed logit 
probability is obtained by taking the integral of the multiplication of the conditional probability with the 
density functions. 
We note that our empirical model includes variables with different characteristics. A number of 
variables differ over cities and time (e.g., connectivity), while there are also time-varying firm- and city-
specific variables (e.g., distance to affiliates). Yet other factors are firm- and city-specific but remain 
constant over time (language distance and geographic distance). Finally, a number of variables in the 
models are only available at the country level, such as the corporate tax rate. As noted earlier, the choice 
set for each RHQ investment project consists of the global cities that are located within the region that 
constitutes the mandate of the RHQ.   
We report the fixed coefficients as the coefficients of interest while summarizing the results of the 
significant random parts of the coefficients. We note that we also estimated conditional logit models. 
These delivered nearly identical results with generally higher significance of the coefficients of interest.  
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
fr,t-1 f fr,t-1
fr f fJ
fj,t-1 f fj,t-1j=1
exp(αX +λ Ζ )P = g(λ )d(λ )exp(αX +λ Ζ ) 
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Table 4 reports results of the mixed logit models of the determinants of location decisions for RHQ 
investments. Model 1 reports the results of a model that includes only the control variables. Model 2-5 
report the results of models with the hypothesis testing variables (cumulatively) included. Model 5 
includes all variables. 
**************INSERT TABLE 4*************** 
Model 1 shows that location choice for RHQ is positively and significantly related to city size 
(population), GDP per capita, the number of top-400 universities in the city, the level of English language 
proficiency in the country of the city, the host country’s relative importance in the region (country/region 
GDP ratio), and the number of the firm’s existing affiliates in the city. Higher wages of skilled labor and 
the language distance between the MNCs country of origin and the country of the global city reduce the 
probability that a city receives RHQ investments. The only less intuitive result is the positive coefficient 
for non-spatial distance between the home and host countries (cultural, economic, and institutional), a 
finding to which we return in our Discussion. 
Model 2 includes the first hypothesis testing variable, the composite measure of connectivity. 
Compared with Model 1, this model shows a significantly improved fit, as indicated by a highly 
significant loglikelihood ratio test. The positive and significant effect of connectivity supports Hypothesis 
1. Model 3 includes the two connectivity variables separately for RHQs with only an entrepreneurial role 
and RHQs with an administrative role, respectively. The coefficient on connectivity for entrepreneurial 
RHQs is only slightly higher than the coefficient on connectivity for administrative RHQs, and a t-test 
cannot reject their equality. Hence, in this model Hypothesis 2 is rejected. 
Model 4 includes the variables distance to HQ and average distance to affiliates. While distance to 
affiliates is negative and significant in support of Hypotheses 3b, distance to HQ has a negative sign but is 
not significantly different form zero, lending no support to Hypotheses 3a. Model 5 adds the interaction 
effects between the two distance variables and connectivity. Both interactions are significant and positive, 
in support of Hypotheses 4a and 4b. At the same time, in the complete specification of Model 5, the 
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connectivity effect of RHQs with an administrative role is no longer significant and a t-test indicates that 
the difference in the connectivity effects between RHQs with an entrepreneurial role and RHQs with an 
administrative role now is significant at the 5 percent level. Hence, Hypothesis 2 does appear to receive 
support if the effects of distance are taken into account, an issue to which we return below.  
The estimates for the random parts of the coefficients show that there exists significant 
heterogeneity in the estimates only for some of the variables. In the fully specified Model 5, this only 
concerns distance to regional affiliates and labor market rigidity. This suggests that there are only limited 
other types of investor and city heterogeneity that lead to variation in the MNCs’ appreciations of city 
characteristics. The variation in the coefficient for distance to affiliates may be an artefact of the specific 
role this variable plays for administrative RHQs only. The mixed logit specification does ensure that the 
estimated main coefficients of the explanatory variables are consistent. 
Interpretation of the Results 
The contrasting results for the difference between the coefficient of connectivity for RHQs with an 
administrative and entrepreneurial role (H2) occur because Model 5 takes into account that the 
importance of connectivity for the administrative RHQ depends crucially on the distance to regional 
affiliates. This also implies that the outcomes of the test for H2 depends on this distance. In Model 5, with 
the distance and connectivity variables are demeaned, the main effect of connectivity for administrative 
RHQs is estimated at the sample mean of distance to regional affiliates. Hence, for administrative RHQs 
in cities with an average distance to affiliates (and average distance to their HQs – but this aspect is 
identical for entrepreneurial RHQs), connectivity effects are weak and not significantly different from 
zero. Yet, once average distance to regional affiliates increase, the impact of connectivity rises 
remarkably and becomes significant. We calculate that at the mean distance for only the subset of 
administrative RHQs, the coefficient of connectivity rises to 2.7 and is significant. At the maximum 
observed distance in the sample, the coefficient rises further to 3.9: this is still below the coefficient on 
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connectivity for entrepreneurial RHQs, but the difference in coefficients is no longer significant. Hence 
we conclude that we find only qualified support for Hypothesis 2.  
Although coefficients estimated with nonlinear models such as the mixed logit model are generally 
not directly interpretable, it has been shown that the average elasticity of the probability of location 
choice with respect to a logarithmic transformed independent variable can be calculated as (Z-1)/Z times 
the coefficient of the variable, where Z is the total number of choices (Greene, 2003, p. 723; Head et al. 
1995, p. 237). In our model, the average number of choices (cities) in the choice set is fourteen. With a 
choice set of this size, the average elasticities approximate over 13/14 of the estimated coefficients of 
continuous variables (which are all logarithmically transformed in the estimated models). The estimates 
on connectivity show that connectivity can have major effects on the attractiveness of global cities for 
RHQ investments. The estimates in Model 2, for instance, suggest that a twenty percent increase in 
connectivity leads to a 45 percent increase in the probability that a city is chosen as the location for RHQ 
investment. By comparison, Shanghai experienced a more than sixty percent increase in connectivity 
between 2002 and 2011. 
We also examined the magnitude of the moderating influence of connectivity on the effect of 
distance. While at average connectivity, the point estimate for affiliate distance is -0.76 (in Model 5 in 
Table 4), our calculations show that this effect becomes more strongly negative at the minimum level of 
connectivity in the sample (-1.18) but that distance becomes insignificant at the maximum connectivity 
within the sample. Similarly, while at average connectivity the effect of HQ distance is insignificant 
(Model 5), this distance effect does becomes significantly negative (-0.74) at the minimum value of 
connectivity in the sample. These findings support the notion that connectivity can render geographic 
distance inconsequential. 
Robustness Checks and Supplementary Analysis 
 We conducted a number of robustness checks and supplementary analyses. First, our composite 
indicator of connectivity averages over three dimensions of connectivity. The rationale of using a 
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composite indicator is that each of the separate connectivity indicators in the composite measure has its 
own drawbacks and measurement error, capturing the broader connectivity benefits of a city only 
partially. To corroborate the importance of using a composite measure, we also estimated models with the 
individual indicators as the focal connectivity measure. These results showed qualitatively similar but 
substantially less significant effects across these models. We interpret these results as indicative that the 
composite measure more accurately reflects relevant international connectivity of cities. 
Another potential concern is the role of external agglomeration effects. Although the analysis 
controlled for “internal” agglomeration and collocation benefits due to the presence of earlier established 
affiliates in the city, knowledge spillovers due to the agglomeration of HQs within the city may also 
provide location benefits to RHQs (Alcacer & Delgado, 2013; Bel & Fageda, 2008; Creszenzi et al., 
2014). The real effects of agglomeration are notoriously difficult to disentangle from the city conditions 
that attract HQ investments in the first place, since these conditions cause HQs to cluster in specific cities 
which create a naturally high correlation between prior RHQ investments and the probability of 
subsequent RHQ investments (Belderbos, van Olffen & Zhou, 2011). Furthermore, analysis of 
agglomeration effects is hampered by the lack of data on establishments (by industry) at the global city 
level. With these caveats in mind and as a second best solution, we explored the robustness of our 
findings to the potential influence of agglomeration effects by including a proxy for HQ agglomeration in 
the cities. We follow Crescenzi et al. (2014) by taking 3-year cumulative prior HQ investments in the city 
as an indicator of HQ agglomeration, scaled by total investments in the city in these three years. Since we 
have to use three years prior investment data from the same data source we draw on to identify RHQ 
investments we lose these years of data and we can estimate the model for only 781 investments during 
2006-2012; yet, the empirical results were qualitatively similar. All hypotheses testing variables had the 
expected sign and all were significant with the exception of the interaction between HQ distance and 
connectivity. 
31 
 
Third, another concern is the restriction of our analysis to a set of 48 well-connected global cities, 
which may potentially lead to selection bias. To examine this, we extend the number of cities in the 
choice set by including 22 additional global cities (as defined by Mastercard) that are less well connected 
(e.g. Bangkok, Bogota, Buenos Aires, Tel Aviv) and 18 non-global cities (e.g. Antwerp, Brisbane, 
Calgary, Manchester, Seattle, Stuttgart, Suzhou). Due to data constraints we could not test models with 
the composite indicator of connectivity. Instead, we compared empirical results of models including these 
different sets of cities using producer service connectivity as the focal measure. While the mean value of 
producer services connectivity of the 48 global cities is 50.75, the mean values of producer services 
connectivity of the 22 additional global cities and the 18 non-global cities are significantly lower at 42.80 
and 23.55, respectively. The number of RHQ investments increases by 310 to 1,341, including 248 
additional investing firms, with an apparent lesser ‘taste’ for connectivity. The coefficient on connectivity 
for administrative and entrepreneurial RHQs increased, rather than decreased, in these specifications, 
suggesting that our results are not upward biased due to selection effects. We posit that the increased 
variation across cities due to the inclusion of less connected cities improves the identification of 
connectivity effects. 
Fourth, the question rises how unique RHQ location choices are in the context of global city 
connectivity. We examined this in a supplementary analysis of the determinants of global city location 
choice for other types of investments by the focal firms. We identified 796 investments (e.g. in 
manufacturing, sales, marketing, logistics) by 236 of the focal firms in the cities in the region after the 
establishment of the RHQ. The results showed clearly that what matters for location choice is the 
geographic distance to the previously established RHQ, rather than distance to HQ or distance to other 
regional affiliates - while connectivity plays a less pronounced role. Hence, after establishment of the 
RHQ, it becomes the focal point for post-RHQ investments. The results are consistent with our theory: 
affiliates established later in the region communicate primarily with the focal RHQ rather than with HQ. 
Hence, in the relationship between the location for newly established affiliates and the RHQs, distance to 
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the RHQ matters - just as distance to existing affiliates in the region matters for the location of RHQs in 
our core analysis. Among the 236 firms investing in new affiliates in the region, 100 firms invested after 
establishing an entrepreneurial RHQs, confirming that these investments often pave the way for further 
expansion by the firm in the region.xiii We also examined whether the role of connectivity differed in 
location choices for divisional and functional HQs. Although we could only identify twelve such 
investments by the focal firms, the results showed a significant impact of city connectivity on location 
choice for divisional and functional HQs that was comparable to RHQs. Hence, connectivity plays an 
important role for other HQ location decisions as well. 
 
DISCUSSION 
RHQs have become a key MNC organizational initiative in the effort to manage the tradeoffs 
between global integration and local responsiveness, to implement global strategies at the regional level, 
and to act on regional opportunities. A distinct aspect of MNC investments, and their HQ operations more 
specifically, is that they are disproportionately concentrated in metropolitan areas (Bel & Fageda, 2008; 
McKinsey & Company, 2013). In fact, prior research has found that MNCs have a clear preference for 
global cities because of their cosmopolitan environment, advanced producer services, and extensive 
connectedness to local and global markets, (Goerzen et al., 2013). Yet, prior literature on MNCs’ HQ 
operations and location decisions has paid little attention to the role of global cities’ connectivity. Our 
research, therefore, is designed to examine the concept of global city connectivity and the role it plays in 
reducing spatial transaction costs that influence the location decisions for new RHQs. In doing so, our 
study contributes to the literature on HQ locations as well as to the economic geography literature on 
global cities by responding to the call by Cano-Kollman et al. (2016) to examine the interplay between 
geographic distance, RHQ roles, and connectivity. 
Whereas previous literature has conceptualized city connectivity from several different lenses 
including the corporate organization perspective that focuses on connectivity provided by the 
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international offices of advanced producer services firms (e.g. Taylor, 2001; Taylor & Aranya, 2008; 
Wagner et al., 2014), an infrastructure perspective that focuses on, for instance, airports (Bel & Fageda, 
2008; Córdoba Ordóñez & Gago García, 2010; Derudder et al., 2010; Mahutga et al., 2010; Pirie, 2010), 
and a knowledge-centered perspective that focuses on knowledge exchange across locations (Bathelt et al., 
2004; Bell & Zaheer, 2007; Boschma & Frenken, 2010; Laud et al., 2009; Matthiessen et al., 2010; 
Miguélez & Moreno, 2013), our research combines these perspectives to develop a novel integrated 
approach. We conceptualize and test a new measure of city connectivity that encompasses the effects of 
flows of people (i.e., airport passengers), services (i.e., producer services firms), and knowledge (i.e., co-
invention). Our results go beyond these earlier contributions by suggesting that each of these partial 
measures are unlikely to provide an adequate view of connectivity and that a composite measure can more 
accurately represent international connectivity. 
Our argument is that city connectivity reduces several forms of spatial transaction costs which, in 
turn, diminishes the role of geographic distance in location choice. We believe our analysis, a mixed logit 
analysis of the location choices of 1,031 new RHQ investments in 48 global cities between 2003 and 
2012, is among the first quantitative analyses of the locational drivers of RHQ investments. We find 
strong support for the role of city connectivity in attracting new RHQ investments: our estimates suggest 
that a twenty percent increase in connectivity leads to a 45 percent increase in the probability that a given 
city is chosen as the location for RHQ investment. We find qualified support for the notion that the 
location decision for RHQs with a focused entrepreneurial role are more sensitive to city connectivity 
than RHQs that are (also) mandated with an administrative role, as entrepreneurial RHQs have specific 
needs to establish relationships with local actors and cannot rely on existing affiliates and regional 
experience. We find that location decisions for administrative RHQs with regional coordination and 
control tasks are driven by the existing spatial configuration of affiliates, with distance to these affiliates 
making cities less attractive. Moreover, our evidence suggests that after the establishment of an RHQ 
MNCs will choose locations that are geographically close to this RHQ for their subsequent investments. 
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Yet most salient: we show that that global cities’ connectivity can render geographic distance between a 
city and an MNC’s regional affiliates inconsequential for the MNC’s location decision. 
Previous studies such as Baaij et al. (2015), Beugelsdijk et al. (2010), Baaij & Slangen (2013) 
and Cano-Kollmann et al. (2016) have made the point that the spatial transaction costs of information and 
knowledge change with various types of distance (e.g., geographic, cultural, etc.) thereby increasing the 
costs of coordination and monitoring (Asmussen & Goerzen, 2013; Boeh & Beamish, 2012; Dellestrand 
& Kappen, 2012; McCann, 2011; Slangen, 2011). We contribute to this stream of research by noting that 
spatial transaction costs matter for RHQs both with regard to the HQ relationships and with regard to 
relationships with regional affiliates. Hence, we provide evidence for the notion highlighted in Baaij & 
Slangen (2013) that HQ disaggregation leads to complex patterns of decision making, involving multiple 
relationships between corporate HQs, RHQs and affiliates. 
We find only a weakly discouraging effect of the geographic distance to HQ on city location 
choice, while the effects of city connectivity increase strongly across this distance. This indicates that 
highly connected cities are more likely to attract RHQs of MNCs from distant home countries. We posit 
that this relates to the specific role of RHQs as bridges of distance between corporate HQ and regional 
affiliates and markets. The decision to establish an RHQ in a region is likely to be driven by the very 
distance between the region and corporate HQ. In case the region of interest is relatively proximate, there 
is probably no reason why the corporate HQ cannot perform control, coordination, and entrepreneurial 
tasks related to its affiliates in the region. Given a substantial distance to the region of interest, the MNC 
is more likely to establish an RHQ precisely to deal with the challenges of distance for effective 
management and coordination. The variation in this distance, which depends on which global city in a 
distant region is chosen, may not often be most salient as a determinant of the RHQ location decision. 
Connectivity, on the other hand, reduces the costs and inconveniences related to geographic distance to 
HQ, which we find to be a key city characteristic attracting distant MNCs’ RHQs. 
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A related finding of interest in this regard is that dimensions of non-spatial distance (economic, 
cultural and economic) between the country of the city and the country of origin of the MNC attract, 
rather than discourages, the establishment of RHQs. This pattern is consistent with the bridging nature of 
RHQs and the necessity for RHQs to locate in ‘distant’ countries to perform this bridging function well. It 
is also related to the specific nature of global cities: global cities are enclaves of cosmopolitanism that 
may be located inside culturally or institutionally distant countries but do not share all the traits of the 
country (e.g., Goerzen et al., 2013). Hence, if RHQs are located in countries with greater non-spatial 
distance from HQ, they may play a more effective bridging role, while the cosmopolitan global city 
environment facilitates operating in such countries. Our findings correspond to the notion that there is 
important subnational variation in cultural and other local traits, with implications for MNC operations in 
host countries. However, while this variation may increase complexity of doing business (Slangen, 2016), 
our findings indicate that if it stems from the presence of unique global city environments, it may 
facilitate operations of MNCs. 
While the characteristics of global cities and the evolution of urban agglomerations have been 
important areas of study in the economic geography literature (Beaverstock et al., 2002; Derudder et al., 
2010; Sassen, 1996; Taylor, 2001), these phenomena have received little attention in international 
business research. Our research contributes to an emerging literature on the role of global cities in 
multinational firms’ location strategies (Goerzen et al., 2013; Ma et al., 2013). More specifically, our 
focus has been on one of the defining notions in the economic geography literature on global cities, i.e., 
that global cities are not ‘bounded phenomena’, but are an intrinsic part of a global network of cities, in 
which they may take a prominent place. Thus, our study serves as an important bridge across the 
economic geography and international business literatures by combining the view on global cities in the 
former domain with the notion of the heterogeneous roles of RHQs in the latter. 
By focusing on the key characteristics of global cities and locational choice for RHQs at a fine-
grained regional level, we extend Goerzen et al.’s (2013) analysis of global cities by providing new 
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insights into their effect on the RHQ location strategies of MNCs. Our argument is that the connectivity 
needs of RHQs are heterogeneous, depending on their mandate and the existing geographic configuration 
of affiliates and the MNC HQ. At the same time, since there is substantial heterogeneity among global 
cities as well, a given global city would be chosen if it economizes significantly on spatial transaction 
relating to the connectivity needs of the RHQ. Hence, both city heterogeneity and MNC heterogeneity 
drive location decisions for new RHQ establishments.  
Our research also extends the HQ location analysis of Benito et al. (2011), Laamanen et al. 
(2012), and Voget (2011) that focused on corporate or divisional HQs by examining the specific drivers 
of regional HQ locations; we demonstrate that the international connectivity of cities, rather than these 
cities’ local characteristics, are behind much of their attraction for RHQ operations. Moreover, we 
augment the work done by Bel & Fageda (2008), Henderson & Ono (2008), and Ma et al. (2013) that 
examined HQ locations at the country or regional level; while these studies have enhanced our knowledge 
of HQ location choices, our study delves beyond into the locational determinants of RHQ locations 
worldwide in the subnational context of global cities. We believe this is an important extension since 
MNCs ultimately choose a specific investment location within a country (Goerzen et al., 2013) and may 
even relocate HQ operations between cities within a country (Strauss-Kahn & Vives, 2009). 
Limitations 
We acknowledge that our research is just a first step in the study of connectivity and HQ 
configurations. Our composite measure of connectivity based on producer services connectivity, airport 
passenger flows, and the intensity of international co-invention is imperfect and future research should 
continue this effort to develop improved indicators. Better indicators of connectivity may also aim to 
differentiate connectivity measures with respect to their geographic patterns and scope. For instance, 
intra-regional connectivity of global cities may play a greater role in RHQ location decisions than 
worldwide connectivity or international connectivity. It is conceivable that an RHQ with a focused 
administrative role, coordinating and orchestrating subsidiary activities within the region, may put more 
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value on a city’s regional connectivity than its international connectivity. Furthermore, the bilateral 
connectivity between the home city of the MNC and a given global city may be a more precise 
determinant of the firm’s location choice than is the city’s overall international connectivity. Therefore, 
more detailed analysis of the connectivity characteristics that drive location choice relating to the best 
“fit” between the geography of the MNC and the connectivity of the city is a promising avenue for future 
research, although this effort may be hampered by the difficulty of obtaining detailed data on regional and 
bilateral connectivity. 
As an important limitation of our approach, we note that our measures distinguishing 
entrepreneurial from administrative mandates are imperfect. While we could identify new RHQs with an 
entrepreneurial mandate at establishment, taking on a pioneering role for the MNC in the region, we could 
not assess to what extent RHQs with an administrative role take on entrepreneurial tasks. This limitation 
in demarcation may also relate to the less clear-cut findings concerning the differential impact of 
connectivity for RHQs with different mandates. We suggest that future work combines secondary data 
with survey data to bring more detail on RHQs relationships and roles into the analysis of location choice. 
A further limitation that may remain with respect to our sample is the fact that the choice set 
available to our focal firms is relatively small. It may be, however, that this issue is an insurmountable 
one for researchers interested in global cities because these places are inherently unique and, therefore, 
limited in number. We have developed several ways to examine the significance of this issue by 
expanding the number of focal firms in our analysis. For example, we extended our models to encompass 
additional choices in our set including 22 less connected global cities (as defined by MasterCard) as well 
as 18 secondary non-global cities. Our results show a pattern consistent with our main findings across the 
difference choice set extensions. Nonetheless, our suggestion to future researchers is to develop more 
comprehensive decision sets to compare and contrast firm choices across locations to create confidence in 
robust findings. 
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Another concern with respect to our findings may be that of possible endogeneity that relates to 
our research design. While we acknowledge this concern, our view is that endogeneity may be less 
worrisome given that our analysis relates to the location decision at the level of the individual RHQ. Thus, 
we believe that -at the firm level- city characteristics could reasonably be understood as given, since the 
individual RHQ choice would not truly add to city connectivity. At the same time, we acknowledge that 
the perception of endogeneity stems from the fact that, at the aggregate level over time, global city 
connectivity and HQ activities co-evolve.  
Our study focuses on RHQs and their relationships with regional affiliates and HQs. Headquarters 
configurations could have a more complex nature in which divisional HQs play a role and HQ tasks are 
dispersed and allocated to specialized units (e.g. Baaij et al., 2015; Barner-Rasmussen et al., 2007; 
Birkinshaw et al., 2006; Desai, 2009). Our preliminary exploration of the role of connectivity for other 
HQs suggested that connectivity is an important consideration of divisional and functional HQs as well. 
We recommend that the analysis of complex headquarters operations and the relationships between such 
headquarters receives the attention it deserves in future work. 
Complementary theoretical perspectives 
Our research on the interplay between RHQ roles, geographic distance, and connectivity connects 
to a broader literature on communication and coordination within multinational firms. Antràs, Garicano, 
& Rossi-Hansberg (2008), for example, highlight the interaction between host-country management skills 
and the quality of communication technologies on MNCs location decisions. Similarly, Bloom, Garicano, 
Sadun & Reenen (2014) examine the impact of information and communication technology suggesting 
that information technology (e.g., computer assisted design) is a decentralizing force in an MNC’s 
location decision, whereas communication technology (e.g., data intranet) is a centralizing force. Thus, 
the literature in this stream reinforces the importance of organizational connectivity and has begun to 
develop a more nuanced conceptual understanding of the nature of transmission and reception of 
information which is at the heart of connectivity. Further, Zhou (2015) has shown that MNCs operating in 
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countries with weak institutions can manage connectivity challenges by specifying the ways in which 
internal channels of information flow and reallocating decision rights can be achieved through 
organizational hierarchy. Thus, these findings complement and combine with our work by reinforcing the 
idea that MNCs design their organization structures to mitigate institutional obstacles to match an RHQ’s 
connectivity needs, which vary in relation to its corporate mandate as well as to the overall geographic 
configuration of the MNC’s activities. 
We employed spatial transaction cost theory as we believe this is a particularly useful lens in the 
analysis of RHQ location choices because it focuses directly on the notion of costs of connectivity that are 
incurred in the alignment (i.e., communication, monitoring, and coordination) of geographically dispersed 
activities. Since MNCs face inherently higher costs of coordination relative to their domestic counterparts 
(Buckley & Casson, 1976), they must be particularly sensitive to the costs of international connectivity 
that emerge as a result of distance. Our basic argument is that global city connectivity can reduce several 
important forms of spatial transaction costs which, in turn, reduces the impact of geographic distance in 
location choice. Our focus specifically on the costs of MNC organization, however, does not diminish the 
importance of alternative perspectives on the question of how MNCs make location choices. One such 
alternative perspective emanates from the resource-based view of the firm; using this lens, firms would 
make location decisions based on their idiosyncratic, path-dependent resources that would be used to 
achieve superior performance. This alternative lens may be seen as a complement to our spatial 
transaction cost perspective. From the resource-based view, the MNC would focus on how particular 
resources in a given location could be captured or on the capabilities available in-house that could be 
leveraged to advantage in that foreign location. In either case, the effort to develop or exploit resources 
could be reconciled with a spatial transaction cost framework by regarding connectivity as a resource that 
a firm could either capture through that location decision, or as exploit if the firm has particular 
capabilities to achieve connectivity. We encourage future studies to explore broader perspectives on the 
intricate relationship between HQ roles, internal and external connectivity, and location. 
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CONCLUSION 
RHQs’ complex needs to connect over geographic space, related to their role as ‘bridge’ between 
corporate HQ and the MNCs’ affiliates and external partners in the region, lead MNCs to establish RHQs 
in internationally connected ‘global’ cities. Which city in a region is chosen to establish the RHQ depends 
on the ‘match’ between city connectivity and the heterogeneous connectivity needs of RHQs and is 
related to the geography of existing operations of the MNC and the RHQ’s mandate. Cities’ international 
connectivity, as manifested in flows of people, services, and knowledge, can render geographic distance 
inconsequential and can attract RHQs from MNCs based in distant locations. 
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ENDNOTES
                                                            
i The definition of world cities or global cities dates back to 1915 when Patrick Geddes (1915) defined 
‘world cities’ as ‘those places where a disproportionate amount of the world’s business is conducted’. 
ii Indeed our data on global RHQ investments suggest that about 60 percent of RHQs are established in 
just 75 global cities. 
iii In a similar vein, the MNC literature on international R&D and intra-firm knowledge flows has shown 
the importance of international co-inventor teams (‘co-practice’) to reap the benefits of dispersed 
knowledge creation (Frost and Zhou, 2005; Singh, 2008). Dispersed R&D activities lead to better quality 
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inventions only if there is sufficient knowledge exchange and collaboration among units of the firm in 
different locations (Lahiri, 2010; Singh, 2008). 
iv  Nachum et al., (2008) make a similar argument, but then with respect to countries’ proximity to 
knowledge bases.  
v Relatively few (70) headquarters investment projects with a worldwide mandate were identified. These 
projects were excluded in the analysis to be consistent with our focus on RHQs. We return to this issue in 
the supplementary analysis. US headquarters were maintained because mandates are often extended to 
North America and because such RHQs have a least 11 US global cities to choose from. 
vi The measure of connectivity resembles the nodal degree centrality in social network theory (Freeman, 
1978). 
vii We obtain yearly data on cities’ connectivity by interpolating values for the intermediate years. For the 
limited number of HQ investments in 2012, we maintain the connectivity index of 2010. 
viii Here we use a methodology developed by the OECD (2011) to demarcate metropolitan areas. Urban 
areas are identified as functional economic units using population density and travel-to-work flows. 
ix Similar empirical results were obtained if we adopted a minimum-maximum aggregation (OECD, 2008) 
rather than the maximum weight aggregation. 
x We set the score for countries for which English is the official language to the maximum score. An 
alternative would be to set the score for these countries to the average score for native speakers (Cuypers, 
Ertug & Hennart, 2015). 
xi We also explored including non-spatial distance effects to the countries hosting regional affiliates, but 
found no significant effects.  
xii The differences in these means between global cities hosting entrepreneurial or administrative RHQs 
are limited. 
xiii In some contrast, the results for R&D investments showed a stronger effect of city connectivity likely 
to be related to greater coordination needs with other R&D units, but no significant negative effect of 
distance to RHQ. 
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Table 1. The distribution of RHQ investments across global cities within regions 
 
 
  
Global city No. of RHQ investments No. of entrepreneurial RHQs No. of administrative RHQs
Singapore 173 93 80
Hong Kong 112 80 32
Shanghai 53 12 41
Sydney 24 21 3
Beijing 17 10 7
Melbourne 12 10 2
Tokyo 7 5 2
Seoul 4 2 2
Total 402 233 169
     
Global city No. of RHQ investments No. of entreprenurial RHQs No. of administrative RHQs
London 165 115 50
Amsterdam 48 27 21
Dublin 38 22 16
Copenhagen 30 24 6
Munich 23 15 8
Paris 20 18 2
Dusseldorf 18 12 6
Geneva 17 9 8
Berlin 16 13 3
Brussels 13 11 2
Stockholm 13 9 4
Vienna 13 4 9
Barcelona 10 9 1
Zurich 10 6 4
Madrid 8 4 4
Prague 7 1 6
Frankfurt 6 4 2
Hamburg 5 2 3
Budapest 5 5 0
Warsaw 4 3 1
Edinburgh 2 2 0
Milan 1 0 1
Athens 0 0 0
Lisbon 0 0 0
Rome 0 0 0
Total 472 315 157
Host region‐Asia Pacific
Host region‐Europe
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Table 1. –continued 
Global city No. of RHQ investments No. of entrepreneurial RHQs No. of administrative RHQs
San Francisco 26 22 4
Atlanta 23 16 7
Chicago 18 7 11
New York 18 13 5
Miami 15 8 7
Boston 14 11 3
Houston 11 8 3
Washington 4 2 2
Philadelphia 7 5 2
Dallas 4 2 2
Los Angeles 5 3 2
Toronto 1 1 0
Vancouver 0 0 0
Total 146 98 48
     
     
Global city No. of RHQ investments No. of entrepreneurial RHQs No. of administrative RHQs
Mexico City 4 2 2
Santiago 7 3 4
Total 11 5 6
Host region‐North America
Host region‐Latin America
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
Note: Descriptives are for untransformed continuous variables. Continuous variables are taken in natural logarithm in the empirical models.  
Varible Name Description and data sources Mean Stdev. Min Max
Location choice
Location choice for a RHQ project. A binary variable taking the value of one if a city 
in the choice set is selected for the focal MNC's regional headquarters investment 
project, and zero for all other cities in the choice set
0.07 0.25 0 1
Connectivity City's composite connectivity index: producer service connecivity, airport conectivity and co-inventor international connectivity. Relative to the maximum value (100) 38.81 11.22 19.05 82.25
Entrepreneurial role
RHQ only has an entrepreneurial role. Dummy variable indicating whether the focal 
firm has no affiliate in the host region prior to the RHQ investment, based on ORBIS. 
Role categorization confirmed by information on the mandates of RHQs from FDI 
Markets
0.65 0.48 0 1
Geographic distance to HQ Distance betweeen global city and city of HQ. In thousand kilometers, great circle method 8.19 3.01 0.03 19.62
Average geographic distance to regional affiliates In thousand kilometers. Regional affiliate data obtained from ORBIS 0.66 1.32 0 14.07
Language distance to HQ Language distance between country of origin and country of the city (Dow & Karunaratna, 2006) 5.05 1.32 1.22 6.09
Other distance to HQ
Composite index of non-spatial distance between country of origin and  country of 
the city: economic, institutional and cultural distance, each relative to the maximum 
value (100). Sources: Hofstede and Berry et al . (2010)
16.16 9.41 1.48 62.05
Labor market rigidity Index of difficulty of hiring, rigidity of hours, and difficulty of firing in the country of the city. World Bank’s Doing Business report 28.99 20.00 0.00 72.00
Population In millions. Source: OECD and Citymayor 4.96 6.23 0.68 36.80
Population density Population divided by the area of the city (Thousand persons/square km) 6.46 8.32 0.30 49.37
GDP per capita In thousand US Dollars 47.02 17.30 4.73 95.61
Ratio of country GDP to region GDP GDP of the country of the city relative to overall GDP of the region that forms the mandate of the RHA. Source: OECD and World Development Indicators 0.05 0.05 0.00062 0.61
Capital city Dummy variable indicating whether the global city is a captical city 0.59 0.49 0 1
Number of top 400 universities Times Higher Education website 2.31 1.97 0 9
English proficiency Country level TOEFL scores relative to maximum scores, by ETS 0.81 0.10 0.54 0.95
Corporate tax rate Corporate tax rate of the country of the city (percentage), from KPMG 29.08 6.95 12.50 45.00
Wage level City wage level index relative to Zurich (100), by UBS 55.08 24.99 6.74 108.38
Firm's # of existing affiliates in the city Number of prior affiliates of the focal firm in the city. Data obtained from ORBIS 0.15 1.86 0 92
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Table 3. Correlations 
 
Note: significant correlations in bold.  
 
 
 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
1. Location choice  
2. Connectivity 0.25  
3. Geographic distance to HQ 0.04 0.05  
4. Geo. distance to regional affi l iates 0.00 0.01 0.15  
5. Language distance to HQ ‐0.13 ‐0.09 0.00 ‐0.01    
6. Other distance to HQ 0.11 0.11 0.30 0.10 0.51  
7. Labor market rigidity ‐0.18 ‐0.18 ‐0.14 ‐0.11 0.33 ‐0.08  
8. Population 0.05 0.39 0.14 0.18 0.13 0.19 ‐0.11  
9. Population density ‐0.03 0.14 ‐0.04 ‐0.02 0.04 0.00 ‐0.12 0.12  
10. GDP per capita 0.00 ‐0.05 ‐0.17 ‐0.15 ‐0.04 ‐0.17 0.01 ‐0.29 ‐0.12  
11. Country/region GDP ratio 0.07 0.00 ‐0.06 ‐0.01 ‐0.07 ‐0.16 ‐0.01 0.41 ‐0.09 ‐0.07  
12. Capital  city 0.05 0.23 ‐0.02 ‐0.01 0.24 0.32 0.16 0.09 ‐0.09 0.12 ‐0.34    
13. Top 400 universities 0.21 0.58 0.04 0.05 ‐0.13 0.04 ‐0.24 0.39 0.00 0.14 0.13 0.20  
14. English proficiency 0.17 0.04 0.02 0.00 ‐0.58 ‐0.23 ‐0.55 ‐0.38 ‐0.10 0.21 ‐0.03 ‐0.26 0.14  
15. Corporate tax rate ‐0.11 ‐0.01 ‐0.05 0.00 0.03 ‐0.27 0.34 0.23 0.09 ‐0.11 0.40 ‐0.30 ‐0.01 ‐0.18  
16. Wage level ‐0.03 ‐0.03 ‐0.16 ‐0.12 ‐0.24 ‐0.42 ‐0.22 ‐0.14 0.33 0.45 0.17 ‐0.36 0.12 0.41 0.24  
17. Firm's # of existing affi l iates in the city 0.07 0.05 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.06 ‐0.05 0.02 ‐0.01 ‐0.03 ‐0.02 0.04 0.05 0.01 ‐0.06 ‐0.07
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Table 4. The determinants of RHQ location choice across global cities: results of mixed logit models 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Connectivity 2.457***
(0.282)
Connectivity ‐ RHQ with an entrepreneurial role 2.640*** 2.638*** 4.006***
(0.393) (0.366) (0.713)
Connectivity ‐ RHQ with an administrative role 2.479*** 2.433*** 0.264
(0.370) (0.365) (1.188)
Geographic distance to corporate HQ ‐0.158 ‐0.081
(0.320) (0.208)
Connectivity * geographic distance to corporate HQ 0.613**
(0.255)
Average geographic distance to regional affiliates ‐0.795*** ‐0.756**
(0.283) (0.296)
Connectivity * average geographic distance to regional affiliates 0.520**
(0.255)
Language distance to corporate HQ ‐0.967*** ‐0.697*** ‐0.652*** ‐0.676*** ‐0.543*
(0.227) (0.198) (0.247) (0.213) (0.302)
Other (cultural, institutional and economic) distance to coporate HQ 0.640*** 0.426*** 0.437*** 0.454*** 0.388**
(0.149) (0.153) (0.151) (0.142) (0.158)
Labor market rigidity ‐0.220 ‐0.143 ‐0.099 ‐0.105 ‐0.167
(0.134) (0.094) (0.105) (0.104) (0.120)
Population 0.347** ‐0.427*** ‐0.460** ‐0.370*** ‐0.457
(0.138) (0.156) (0.192) (0.131) (0.296)
Population density 0.012 0.003 ‐0.016 ‐0.042 ‐0.045
(0.065) (0.047) (0.057) (0.064) (0.055)
GDP per capita 0.687*** 0.674*** 0.590*** 0.545** 0.517*
(0.201) (0.218) (0.218) (0.221) (0.288)
Country/region GDP ratio 0.156** 0.343*** 0.325*** 0.285*** 0.291***
(0.077) (0.074) (0.075) (0.073) (0.100)
Capital city dummy ‐0.174 ‐0.123 ‐0.085 ‐0.032 ‐0.108
(0.155) (0.152) (0.213) (0.168) (0.152)
Number of top 400 universities 0.337** 0.187 0.178 0.129 0.167
(0.148) (0.145) (0.180) (0.108) (0.285)
English proficiency 5.994*** 4.298*** 4.126*** 4.419*** 4.913***
(0.788) (0.728) (0.929) (0.754) (0.852)
Corporate tax rate 0.052 ‐0.222 ‐0.390 ‐0.176 ‐0.171
(0.379) (0.326) (0.654) (0.581) (0.497)
Wage level ‐0.390*** ‐0.277** ‐0.210 ‐0.205 ‐0.209
(0.135) (0.141) (0.248) (0.185) (0.174)
Firm's # of existing affiliates in the city 1.842*** 1.655*** 1.679*** 0.957*** 1.058***
(0.335) (0.331) (0.363) (0.208) (0.262)
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Table 4-continuted 
 
  
Notes: Results of a mixed logit model (see equation (1)) relating the probability that a particular global city is chosen as the location for a MNC’s 
newly established RHQ to locational characteristics of the cities and MNC and RHQ characteristics. Results are for 1031 RHQ investments by 940 
MNCs in 48 global cities. RHQs with entrepreneurial mandate are the first establishments of the MNC in the city; RHQs with administrative 
mandates may or may not combine this with an entrepreneurial role. The independent variables are lagged by one year (see Table 2 for 
definitions). The continuous variables are in natural logarithm and their coefficients can be interpreted as close to elasticities. Cluster-robust 
standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
 
 
 
Standard errors of random parts coefficients
Average geographic distance to regional affiliates 1.000*** 0.754*
(0.353) (0.410)
Connectivity * average geographic distance to regional affiliates  
Labor market rigidity 0.743**
(0.367)
Population 0.653**
(0.268)
GDP per capita 1.337*** 1.682*** 1.481* 1.705***
(0.465) (0.535) (0.851) (0.450)
Capital city dummy ‐0.744*
(0.386)
Number of top 400 universities 2.206*** 2.338*** 2.216*** ‐1.239***
(0.738) (0.833) (0.747) (0.363)
Observations 14,933 14,933 14,933 14,933 14,933
Number of RHQ projects 1,031 1,031 1,031 1,031 1,031
Number of firms 940 940 940 940 940
Average number of cities in choice set 14 14 14 14 14
Wald chisquare 477.7*** 458.2*** 438.4*** 541.1*** 406.1***
Likelihood‐ratio test 110***(vs.Model1) 112*** (vs. Model1) 58***(vs.Model3) 2(vs.Model4)
 54 
 
 
Figure 1. Conceptual Model 
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